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Do We Take a Robot’s Needs into Account?
The Effect of Humanization on Prosocial Considerations
Toward Other Human Beings and Robots
Sari R.R. Nijssen, MSc, Evelien Heyselaar, PhD, Barbara C.N. Müller, PhD, and Tibor Bosse, PhD
Abstract
Robots are becoming an integral part of society, yet the extent to which we are prosocial toward these nonliving objects
is unclear. While previous research shows that we tend to take care of robots in high-risk, high-consequence situations,
this has not been investigated in more day-to-day, low-consequence situations. Thus, we utilized an experimental
paradigm (the Social Mindfulness ‘‘SoMi’’ paradigm) that involved a trade-off between participants’ own interests
and their willingness to take their task partner’s needs into account. In two experiments, we investigated whether
participants would take the needs of a robotic task partner into account to the same extent as when the task partner was
a human (Study I), and whether this was modulated by participant’s anthropomorphic attributions to said robot (Study
II). In Study I, participants were presented with a social decision-making task, which they performed once by
themselves (solo context) and once with a task partner (either a human or a robot). Subsequently, in Study II,
participants performed the same task, but this time with both a human and a robotic task partner. The task partners were
introduced via neutral or anthropomorphic priming stories. Results indicate that the effect of humanizing a task partner
indeed increases our tendency to take someone else’s needs into account in a social decision-making task. However,
this effect was only found for a human task partner, not for a robot. Thus, while anthropomorphizing a robot may lead
us to save it when it is about to perish, it does not make us more socially considerate of it in day-to-day situations.
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Introduction
Atotal of 41.8 million robots are projected to be partof households around the world by 20201 to conduct
tasks that are menial to humans, such as domestic assistance.2
While these technological developments can enrich people’s
lives3 they also pose challenges. For example, the appearance
of robots is becoming increasingly human-like, causing us to
view them as more than tools.4 In situations where the life of
a human-like robot is threatened, people sacrifice a group of
anonymous humans to save that robot’s ‘‘life’’5 or empathize
with a robot when it is physically mistreated.6
Yet, these kinds of scenarios do not reflect our day-to-day
interactions with robotic devices. On a day-to-day basis, the
majority of our prosocial behavior toward other humans
consists of small acts of prosociality (e.g., giving someone
directions or considering someone’s perspective when taking
a decision). Clearly, not wanting someone or something to
perish involves different affective motivations than giving
directions. Indeed, prosocial behavior increases as a function
of urgency7 and potential harm.8 Similarly, people empa-
thize more with a robot that is being severely maltreated
compared to a robot that is being treated kindly.9 Thus,
while previous research shows that we can be moral or
empathetic toward robots in urgent and high-consequence
situations, we do not know whether day-to-day, low-
consequence acts of prosocial behavior occur as well. Yet,
since robotic devices are becoming increasingly common in
the household, it is pertinent to understand the mechanisms
that ground our common, day-to-day interactions with them.
Are we prosocial toward robotic devices, and if so, which
factors influence this?
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Prosocial behavior consists of actions that benefit people
other than oneself, such as helping, sharing, or comforting.10
In human–human interaction, prosocial behavior allows us
to form and maintain relationships with people. For us to
behave in a way that benefits another individual, we need to
be able to consider that individual’s needs and desires. Thus,
prosocial behavior involves the ability to take another per-
son’s perspective,11 understand that their needs and desires
may be different from our own,12 and possibly experience
empathic concern toward them.13,14
Prosocial behavior presupposes that the target of our proso-
cial action has mental states and has affective experiences.
Arguably, currently available robots do not have emotional
experiences or needs similar to humans.15 Yet, humans have a
strong tendency to perceive nonhuman agents in human terms
by attributing mental states, emotions, and intentions to them: a
phenomenon called anthropomorphism.16,17 Specifically relat-
ing to the human–machine interaction, the Media Equation
theory18 and Computers As Social Actors (CASA) paradigm19
claim that humans will respond to any type of object (such as a
computer) as if they are human, provided enough social cues are
present.
The link between prosociality and the attribution of mental
states to nonhuman agents opens up the intriguing possibility
that we act prosocially toward robots when we anthropo-
morphize them. Indeed, anthropomorphizing a nonhuman
agent has been shown to lead to more interpersonal con-
nectedness20 and higher trust.21 Specifically, anthropomor-
phizing a robot leads to processing its movement as human,22
joint attention,23 increased trust,24 and moral care.5,6,9
However, previous research on human–robot interaction was
done in urgent and high-consequence situations. Therefore,
results cannot be generalized to low-consequence situations.
An established paradigm for measuring everyday, low-
consequence acts of prosociality is the Social Mindfulness
(SoMi) paradigm.25 The SoMi paradigm measures our will-
ingness to consider another individual’s needs before our own.
In the SoMi task, participants have to repeatedly choose among
three items of the same category (e.g., pens). Crucially, two
items are identical, while one item differs in a certain aspect
(e.g., two blue and one black pen). Participants are told that they
have to choose an item, but that someone else will pick some-
thing from the remaining items after them. It is counted how
often the participant picks the socially mindful item (of which
there were two so the task partner still has a choice between two
unique items). The overall proportion of socially mindful versus
nonsocially mindful choices thus gives an indication of a par-
ticipant’s overall willingness to consider the task partner’s
needs. In human–human interaction, participants have shown to
be more socially mindful in their decision-making when another
individual has to pick after them.26 Furthermore, SoMi scores
have been correlated with measures such as general empathy.25
The current research investigated social mindfulness to-
ward robots. Two separate studies were conducted utilizing
the SoMi paradigm.a In Study I, participants were presented
with two experimental blocks: in one, they performed the
SoMi task alone, that is, they had to make choices between
items without a partner. In the other block, they performed
the classic SoMi task with a partner (a human or a robot). We
hypothesized that (1a) more socially mindful choices would
be made in the social condition than in the solo condition;
and we further expected that (1b) participants would make
more socially mindful decisions when the partner was an-
other human compared with a robot.
In Study II, we investigated the effect of anthropomorphic
attributions on the level of social mindfulness. Participants per-
formed the SoMi task with another human and a robot, both of
which were described in either human-like and anthropomorphic
terms or in neutral and mechanical terms. We hypothesized (2a)
participants in the anthropomorphic condition to be more so-
cially mindful than participants in the neutral condition, (2b)
regardless of whether their partner was a human or a robot.
Study I
Methods
Participants. The minimum required sample was deter-
mined to be n = 134 (67 participants per condition), using
G*Power (with a = 0.05, b = 0.80, dz = 0.35). The effect size
used was based on a previous effect size comparing re-
sponses with humans and robots5 since this study used a
similar experimental design. This effect size was divided by
two to obtain a conservative estimate.
A total of n = 136 undergraduate students were recruited to
participate in this study in exchange for course credit. All
provided informed consent before participation. Based on
preregistered exclusion criteria, 12 participants were drop-
ped from the analysis for completing the study in less than 3
minutes, as well as 2 participants who took more than 90
minutes. This resulted in a final sample of 122 students
(Mage = 22.11 – 4.98, 83 females).
Materials and procedure. Participants completed the
experiment on their own computer in a quiet environment
using Qualtrics. After signing up, participants received a link
to the online experiment. Before the experiment started,
participants were instructed to ensure they would not be in-
terrupted for the duration of the experiment (–20 minutes).
The solo condition was completed by all participants. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to the social-human or
social-robot condition. The presentation order of the solo and
social block was counterbalanced. Each block consisted of 12
trials (6 test- and 6 distractor trials). During test trials, partic-
ipants were presented with three items from which they had to
choose one. In all test trials, two objects were identical and one
object was different. The distractor trials contained four similar
items: two of each type. The presentation order of the test and
distractor trials and the order of items were randomized.
In the solo condition, participants were instructed to imagine
that they can take the object they chose home with them. In the
social condition, participants were informed that someone else
would choose between the remaining items. In both conditions,
a picture of the task partner was displayed.5,27 Subsequently,
participants provided their age and gender, were thanked, de-
briefed, and awarded course credit. The experimental proce-
dure was approved by the institutional review board of the
affiliated university. Specific examples of our materials as well
as details of the data analysis procedure can be found in the
Supplementary Material.
Results
Participants’ choices in the social mindfulness trials were
analyzed using a binomial mixed-effects logit model28 in R. No
DO WE TAKE A ROBOT’S NEEDS INTO ACCOUNT? 333
significant effect of task partner was found, p = 0.697. The
proportion of sociallymindful choices didnot differ between the
solo (M = 0.53 – 0.20) and the social-human (M = 0.55 – 0.23)
or social-robot (M = 0.56 – 0.25) conditions.
Discussion
Contrary to hypotheses 1a and 1b, we could not detect
any differences between the solo and social conditions, nor
between the human and robot task partners in the social
condition.
Looking at the proportions of socially mindful choices,
our results align with other ‘‘neutral’’ conditions in the SoMi
paradigm.25,26 Similar to our findings, van Doesum et al.25
report social mindfulness proportions at chance level when
participants are not given any explicit instructions; only after
explicit instruction to take their partner’s perspective do they
find a significant increase in social mindfulness. In addition,
in a real-life version of the task, van Doesum et al.26 report a
chance level of social mindfulness when no partner is pres-
ent. However, when a partner is present, the rate of social
mindfulness increases significantly.
Comparing this with our findings, we can draw two pre-
liminary conclusions. First, the level of social mindfulness in
our solo condition is on par with similar human–human
baseline conditions in the literature. Second, our social con-
dition did not sufficiently trigger participants to take the per-
spective of their partner as we only presented a picture and
provided no other information. As previous research used
explicit perspective-taking instructions, we thus designed a
follow-up study in which participants were induced to take
their partner’s perspective using vignettes. Participants’ social
mindfulness toward a robotic and human task partner was
assessed, while vignettes of the task partners were presented to
induce participants’ attributions of mental states.
Study II
Methods
Participants. The minimum required sample size was
n = 128 (64 per group), using G*Power (a = 0.05, b = 0.80,
gp
2 = 0.059). A total of n = 128 (Mage = 26.54 – 11.10, 78 fe-
males) participants participated in the study in exchange for
course credit. Participants were recruited both in the partic-
ipant pool of the researchers’ local university and through
social media. All participants provided informed consent
before their participation.
Materials and procedure. This experiment had a 2
(Partner: human vs. robot; within-subjects) by 2 (Condition:
anthropomorphic vs. neutral; between-subjects) mixed de-
sign. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. The
materials and procedure were similar to Study I except that
no solo condition was present. The presentation order of the
human and robot block was counterbalanced.
Each block consisted of an introduction to the task partner
followed by 12 SoMi trials. Participants were introduced to
their task partner with a vignette. In the anthropomorphic
condition, these vignettes described the task partner in a
humanized manner, that is, by emphasizing mental states
such as their emotions and intentions. In the neutral condi-
tion, vignettes described the task partner in a neutral manner,
without referring to their mental states (for more details
about the vignettes, see Majdandžić et al.29; Nijssen et al.5).
A picture of the task partner was presented next to the vi-
gnettes. The combination of the vignettes and pictures was
counterbalanced. The task partner was consistently referred to
with a letter (e.g., ‘‘H’’). Importantly, participants in the an-
thropomorphic condition read a humanized vignette for both
the robotic partner and the human partner; idem for partici-
pants in the neutral condition. The humanizing versus neutral
manipulation effect of the vignettes was validated in previous
work.5,29 Subsequently, participants provided their age and
gender, were thanked, debriefed, and awarded course credit.
The experimental procedure was approved by the institutional
review board of the affiliated university. Specific examples of
our materials as well as details of the data analysis procedure
can be found in the Supplementary Material.
Results
Participants’ choices in the social mindfulness trials were
analyzed using a binomial mixed-effects logit model28 in R.
A significant main effect of condition was found (b = -0.29,
Wald Z = -2.95, p < 0.001), with a larger proportion of so-
cially mindful choices made in the anthropomorphic
(M = 0.64 – 0.19) versus the neutral (M = 0.52 – 0.20) condi-
tion. No significant main effect was found for task partner
(b = 0.10, Wald Z = 1.58, p = 0.087). However, a significant
interaction effect of condition and task partner (b = -0.14,
Wald Z = -2.19, p = 0.017) was found.
Participants made significantly more socially mindful
decisions toward the human partner in the anthropomorphic
(M = 0.69 – 0.23) versus the neutral (M = 0.52 – 0.24) condi-
tion (v2 = 24.68, p < 0.001). For the robot partner, this dif-
ference did not reach statistical significance (M = 0.60 – 0.24
in the anthropomorphic condition vs. M = 0.53 – 0.27 in the
neutral condition; p = 0.074). The significant interaction thus
indicates that the difference in social mindfulness between
the neutral and anthropomorphic conditions was significantly
higher for the human partner than the robot partner.
Two additional binomial mixed-effects logit models with
the social condition (picture-only) from Study I as the ref-
erence group (Fig. 1) showed no significant difference be-
tween conditions for the robot partner (all ps > 0.396). For
the human partner, the anthropomorphic condition yielded
significantly more socially mindful choices than the social
(picture-only) condition from Study I (b = 0.72, Wald
Z = 3.53, p < 0.001). The neutral condition from Study II and
social (picture-only) condition from Study I did not statisti-
cally differ (b = -0.14, Wald Z = -0.74, p = 0.338).
General Discussion
The current research investigated whether anthropomor-
phizing robots would affect prosocial behavior in a social
decision-making task. Results of Study I show that the same
level of socially mindful decisions was made in a solo con-
text as with a human or robot partner. Results of Study II
show that participants became significantly more socially
mindful in the anthropomorphic condition, thus confirming
hypothesis 2a. However, this effect was only found for the
human partner: participants took the needs of their human
partner into account more often when their mental states and
emotions were emphasized than when they were not. For the
334 NIJSSEN ET AL.
robot partner, the difference in level of social mindfulness
between the neutral and anthropomorphic condition was not
significant—thus rejecting hypothesis 2b.
This research utilized an experimental paradigm that al-
lowed us to measure day-to-day, low-consequence prosocial
behavior. This stands in sharp contrast to previous research
on prosocial behavior toward robots, which relied on urgent
and high-consequence scenarios. While previous research
showed that people in such scenarios are indeed more likely
to, for example, protect an anthropomorphized robot from
harm,5 trust an anthropomorphized car more despite it caus-
ing an accident,21 or empathize more with a robot that is
being physically mistreated,6 our results indicate that this
effect of anthropomorphism does not necessarily extend to
more common, low-consequence prosocial considerations.
This is in line with previous research showing that partici-
pants empathize more with a suffering than a nonsuffering
robot.9 Moreover, our results match the dynamics of prosocial
behavior in human–human interaction: people tend to be
more prosocial toward someone when the urgency7 or po-
tential harm8 of their situation increases. Linking this to our
findings, the social decision-making trials in our two exper-
iments were not constructed as highly urgent or highly
harmful situations. The task partner simply lost out on an
opportunity to choose between everyday items. In sum, our
findings point to a relevant distinction based on urgency in the
effects of anthropomorphism for human–robot interaction.
It should be noted, however, that the neutral vignettes used in
this study also included some anthropomorphic cues regarding a
robot’s autonomy. Moreover, it could be argued that the content
of the vignettes confounded participants’ perception of the
agent. However, the distinct effect of the neutral versus hu-
manizing vignettes on mentalizing, liking, and empathy was
confirmed in previous research.5,29 In addition, previous studies
used several different vignettes for each category (humanizing
vs. neutral) and found no differences between the individual
vignettes in each category; furthermore, the vignettes that were
quantitatively confirmed in previous studies as most distinctly
emphasizing humanness versus neutrality were selected for the
current study. Even though we thus confirmed the humanizing
versus neutral effects of the manipulation in the current study, it
would be interesting to include measures of empathy and liking
as potential mediators in follow-up research.
This research is among the few investigations of human–
robot interaction that directly compared participants’ be-
havior toward robots with behavior toward humans. Many
experiments on human–robot interaction focus solely on how
anthropomorphizing versus nonanthropomorphizing affects
certain behavioral parameters.24 However, our results show a
clear distinction in the effects of our manipulation on human
versus robot partners. Thus, if studies on human–robot in-
teraction want to investigate certain behavioral parameters
and draw conclusions about how those behaviors compare
with human–human interaction, including an experimental
condition in which those parameters are measured vis-à-vis
another human seems pertinent.
While our findings are relevant and have clear theoretical and
practical implications, they are not in line with the long-standing
Media Equation Theory and the CASA paradigm.18,19 While
these models of human–machine interaction entail that we treat
any machine as a human as long as it displays sufficient social
cues, in our study, anthropomorphic vignettes did not signifi-
cantly increase participants’ social mindfulness toward robots.
This may be because our study did not involve any real-life
interactions, in contrast to the empirical studies by Nass and
Moon.19 Our results should thus be corroborated in future re-
search, especially in real-life human–robot interaction settings.
Given the increasing role of robotic devices in our daily
lives, a better understanding of the mechanisms that support
our interactions with them is pertinent. Our results show that
effects of anthropomorphism cannot be generalized across
different types of social interactions: while we may be in-
clined to care for an anthropomorphic robot when it is about
to be demolished does not mean we take its needs and desires
into account in an ordinary situation.
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FIG. 1. Overview of statistical
results. In the left-hand panel, the
proportion of socially mindful
choices in the solo condition of
Study I is displayed. In the middle
panel, the proportion of socially
mindful choices with a robot task
partner is illustrated, in the picture-
only condition of Study I as well as
in the neutral and anthropomorphic
conditions of Study II. The same
conditions are displayed for the
human task partner in the right-
hand panel.
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